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The deterrent effect of law enforcement rests on the link between the actual and the perceived 
detection risk. We study the role of word of mouth for this linkage. Our approach makes use 
of micro data on compliance with TV license fees allowing us to distinguish between 
households who have been subject to enforcement and those who have not. Exploiting local 
variation in field inspectors’ efforts induced by snowfall, we find a striking response of 
households to increased enforcement in their vicinity, with compliance rising significantly 
among those who had no interaction with inspectors. As we can exclude other channels of 
information transmission, our finding establishes a substantial deterrent effect mediated by 
word of mouth. 
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Over the last decade, a growing number of studies have provided evidence supporting
Becker’s (1968) model of crime. While several contributions have identiﬁed a deterrent
impact of sanctions (Kessler and Levitt, 1999; Drago et al., 2007) and a negative eﬀect of
police on crime (Corman and Mocan, 2000; Levitt, 2002; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004),
the channels through which deterrence is actually achieved are less clear. In particular, we
know little about the mechanisms through which an increase in enforcement will ultimately
aﬀect the behavior of individuals.
Evidently, the link between the actual level of law enforcement and the corresponding
perceptions of individuals is of key importance for enforcement policies to become eﬀective.
Relaxing Becker’s assumption that the detection probability is common knowledge, Sah
(1991) has analyzed the evolution of individual risk perceptions and the corresponding co-
evolution of crime. In his model, the agents update their perceived detection risk based on
information obtained from sampling in their vicinity. This updating establishes a positive
linkage between enforcement and compliance. Although empirical studies have shown that
individual beliefs about the detection risk are indeed responsive to personal experience with
the criminal justice system (Lochner, 2007),1 there is still no evidence on the responsiveness
of compliance behavior to information obtained from sampling. This dearth of evidence on
the policy-to-perception and perception-to-behavior link is considered as one of the major
gaps in deterrence research (Nagin, 1998).
The present paper provides results which contribute to closing this gap. More precisely,
our aim is to distinguish empirically between a direct and an indirect deterrent eﬀect of
enforcement. While the direct eﬀect works through the updating of risk perceptions based
on personal experience, the indirect eﬀect is driven by ‘word of mouth’, i.e. an updating
based on sampling among acquaintances. To disentangle these eﬀects, we exploit micro
1Earlier contributions include Richards and Tittle (1982), Horney and Marshall (1992), Parker and
Grasmick (1979), Paternoster et al. (1985), and Piliavin et al. (1986). Further evidence is discussed in
Nagin (1998).
1data on the enforcement of TV licence fees and households’ compliance behavior. In this
setting, enforcement is not publicly observable and targeted to individual households. This
distinctive feature enables us to distinguish between households who have been subject to
enforcement and those who have not. The empirical investigation then tracks the response
of ‘untreated’ households to the level of enforcement targeted at other households in their
vicinity. We ﬁnd striking evidence of a strong behavioral response to increased enforce-
ment. Since our setting allows us to exclude other channels of information transmission,
we conclude that the change in behavior of untreated households must be driven by treated
households communicating their experience within their circle of acquaintances. Hence, our
empirical ﬁndings establish an indirect deterrent eﬀect of enforcement which is mediated
by word of mouth.
Our analysis builds on unique data on the Austrian TV licence fee system. There are
several reasons which render this institution ideal for the purpose of our study. Firstly,
the enforcement of the fees involves licensing inspectors approaching individual households,
providing us with an unambiguous measure of detected violations of the law. Secondly, the
activity of the inspectors is not observable to the public: their presence in a community is
not announced, they are non-uniformed and they do not use any police-like cars. Hence,
there remain two ways in which households can learn about the local level of enforcement –
personal experience and word of mouth. Thirdly, we beneﬁt from using households’ unso-
licited registrations for the payment of licence fees as a measure for the behavioral response
to enforcement. Focusing on quit decisions, i.e. the decision of households who deviate from
the law and stop doing so, is a novel approach in empirical studies of deterrence.2 Apart
from allowing us to avoid typical problems associated with the measurement of crime rates
(see Levitt, 1998; MacDonald, 2002), the use of quit decisions assures that there is no
scope for crime displacement – in particular, the relocation of law violations in response to
increased local enforcement – to drive our results (Jacob et al., 2007).
Based on a record of household-level data on all unsolicited registrations for TV licence
2As we will discuss below, these decisions can be understood as an implicit form of self-reporting as
studied in Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
2fees and enforcement by inspectors for the period from November 2005 to March 2006, we
construct a panel of monthly enforcement and registration rates. The rates are aggregated
at the level of municipalities with a median size of 900 households. We then estimate
the impact of enforcement on unsolicited registrations. To avoid problems related to the
likely endogeneity of inspectors’ enforcement activities, we follow an instrumental variables
strategy. We use descriptors of local weather and driving conditions – snowfall and the
frequency of car accidents – as instrumental variables.3 These instruments are motivated
by a number of facts: ﬁrst of all, licensing inspectors work under piece-rate contracts
without being reimbursed for the time spent on traveling, and they independently choose
when and where to become active. Furthermore, the time period under consideration
was characterized by record breaking levels of snowfall. Hence, for licensing inspectors,
the decision where to go became an important one in terms of the opportunity costs of
traveling. Finally, Austria is an alpine country with strong regional variation in terms of
accessibility during periods of heavy snowfall, providing most inspectors with an option to
trim their traveling plans towards areas with reasonable driving conditions. It turns out
that our instruments are strong predictors for actual enforcement levels. As conjectured,
inspectors respond to their piece-rate incentives, avoiding regions which are more diﬃcult
to access in the presence of poor driving conditions.
Exploiting the exogenous variation in enforcement induced by our instruments, we ﬁnd
that an increase in enforcement has a signiﬁcant impact on unsolicited registrations: on
average, three detections by licensing inspectors trigger one additional unsolicited registra-
tion. Given that the scope for the indirect deterrence eﬀect is limited by a high overall
compliance level, the estimated eﬀect is sizable. We analyze the sensitivity of this result
with respect to cases which could potentially be driven by direct exposure to enforcement.
All our additional estimations conﬁrm that the observed deterrence eﬀect is driven by the
dispersion of information on enforcement through word of mouth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst describe the institutional
3Using weather conditions as instrumental variables relates our approach to Miguel et al. (2004) and
Jacob et al. (2007).
3background. Section 3 motivates our empirical approach and discusses estimation methods
and data. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In most countries of the world, a signiﬁcant share of broadcasting is provided by public
broadcasters, which are mostly funded by broadcasting licence fees (Newcomb, 2004). A
typical licence fee system is in place in Austria. According to the Austrian Broadcasting
Licence Fee Act (BLFA in the following), every household must register its operational TVs
and radios. Irrespective of the number of household members, only one licence fee has to
be payed per household. Technically, however, public broadcasting programs can also be
received without paying the annual fee, which ranged from e 206 to e 263 in 2005/2006.4
Licence fees are managed by ‘Fee Information Service’, henceforth FIS, a subsidiary of the
Austrian Public Broadcasting Company. In 2005, 94% of all Austrian households were
registered and payed a total of e 650 million (0.3% of GDP).5
The number of registered households is in permanent ﬂux. In principle, households can
always de-register, stating that they no longer operate any broadcasting receiver. Those who
do so, however, will be thoroughly checked by the FIS enforcement division (see below).
An easier way to escape fees emerges in case of moving. Broadcasting registrations are
attached to the place of residence, and the law requires moving households to update their
registration details with FIS. De-registering at the old place without registering at the new
place gives households an opportunity to start evading without the need to explicitly state
the absence of TV and radio receivers.
FIS tracks evasion of fees by comparing residence data with its own data base. In
principle, all residents who have not registered a TV or radio are treated as potential
evaders. Of course, this mechanism does not perfectly identify those who do not comply with
4License fees are typically paid by direct debit. There also exists a reduced fee which only covers radios
(e 60 – e 76 p.a.). All fees diﬀer between the federal states.
5Less than one percent of households hold neither a radio nor a TV (Statistics Austria, 2006). The
ﬁgure of 94% therefore gives a reasonable proxy for the overall compliance rate.
4the BLFA, but it provides FIS with well-deﬁned targets for speciﬁc enforcement measures:
potential evaders are ﬁrst addressed in a mailing, which asks them to clarify their status
and register for licence fees.6 The data of those who do not respond to a mailing are then
handed over to FIS’ enforcement division. Members of this division, so called “licensing
inspectors”, enforce the BLFA in the ﬁeld by personally approaching target households. FIS
can impose a ﬁne of up to e 2,180 on detected evaders. In addition, a detected household
eventually has to pay evaded fees for several past months. Note that the maximum level
of ﬁnes is also communicated in the 100,000 mailings which are sent by FIS every year.
The availability of this penalty is reﬂected in a recent national survey, ﬁnding that 55% of
Austrian households expect ‘severe’ or ‘very severe’ sanctions if they are detected cheating
on licence fees.7
¿From November 2005 to March 2006, mailings resulted in 12,327 registrations, while
ﬁeld inspections contributed a total of 28,193 new registrations. However, as shown in Table
1, the bulk of registrations came from unsolicited registrations. Such registrations originate
from households who send in a hard-copy registration form which is available at municipal
and post oﬃces as well as at branches of banks. Alternatively, one may also register online,
using a web form, or by phone. In the ﬁve months covered by our data, hard-copy forms
accounted for 31,164 unsolicited registrations, while 17,864 households registered online or
via phone.
For what follows, it will be useful to highlight several features of FIS’ enforcement sys-
tem. During the period under consideration, 207 inspectors were active, most of them
working part-time. As mentioned above, inspectors are non-uniformed and do not use any
oﬃcial, police-like but their private cars. In contrast to police on the streets, the presence
of licensing inspectors is therefore not visible to the general public. Each inspector gets
assigned a limited number of municipalities (18 on average, with several overlaps). They
6See Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2009) for a ﬁeld experiment testing diﬀerent strategies in these
mailings.
7For black labor market participation [skiving oﬀ work], the corresponding ﬁgure is 60% [38%]. The
data from this survey (N = 1138), which are further discussed in Traxler and Winter (2009), are available
from the authors.
5Table 1: Number of new registrations by type (Nov 2005 – Mar 2006)
Type of registration Count Percentage
Response to mailing 12,327 13.77
Field inspection 28,193 31.48
Unsolicited registration 49,028 54.75
– hard-copy 31,164 34.80
– online and phone 17,864 19.95
Total number of registrations 89,548 100.00
are payed according to a simple piece-rate contract (without any ﬁxed income component),
earning a premium of e 20 for every new registration they deliver. Equipped with infor-
mation on target households, inspectors independently choose their eﬀort. In particular,
they independently decide when and where to become active. Neither are there any public
announcements which municipalities are going to be inspected nor is there any coordina-
tion among individual inspectors. FIS solely requires inspectors to cover every municipality
within their domain at least once per year. However, as travel expenses are not reimbursed,
inspectors seem to have little incentives to regularly cover remote and sparsely populated
areas.
Inspectors are credited for two types of registrations. First of all, they get the piece-rate
for each registration generated by face-to-face interaction with a target household. When it
does not come to personal interaction (e.g. nobody was met at home), inspectors leave an
information brochure with a registration form. If the form is returned later, FIS identiﬁes
the respective inspector from a code printed on the form and credits the inspector with the
registration (8% of all registrations credited with ﬁeld inspectors emerge in this way).
3 Measuring Deterrence
Our analysis focuses on the choice to register for licence fees and the impact of enforcement
on this decision. Before turning to the estimation approach and the data, we brieﬂy discuss
the relation between registering, self-reporting and enforcement.
63.1 Registering, Self-Reporting and Enforcement
Consider the decision of an agent j to register or not to register his TV in a simple one
period setting. If he does register, he has to pay licence fees and his utility is Ur
j. If he does
not register, he may get detected by a licensing inspector resulting in a utility level of Ud
j .
In case he remains undetected, he does not pay fees and his utility is Uu
j , with Uu
j > Ud
j .
The agent will prefer to register whenever
U
r
j ≥ pj U
d
j + (1 − pj)U
u
j , (1)
where pj denotes the perceived risk of detection.8
Our analysis focuses on potential evaders, for which Uu
j > Ur
j > Ud
j . For these agents,
evading fees is potentially attractive. For a suﬃciently high detection risk pj, however,
condition (1) will be met and the potential evader is deterred: he would register.9 Such a
registration can be interpreted as an implicit form of self-reporting: whenever these agents
register, they do so because they “fear more severe treatment if they do not” (Kaplow and
Shavell, 1994, p.583). In our case, they avoid ﬁnes, supplementary payments of fees and
the embarrassing interaction with a ﬁeld inspector.
Let us now turn to the link between self-reporting behavior and the enforcement activity
of licensing inspectors. We consider the formation of agents’ risk perceptions, pj, as the
process through which enforcement can aﬀect registrations.10 Generally, one might think
of individuals updating their beliefs about the detection risk based on their own experience
8The case of heterogenous risk perceptions is supported by many studies which report substantial varia-
tion in the perceived risk of detection. E.g., see Lochner (2007), Montmarquette et al. (1985), and Richards
and Tittle (1982).
9FIS runs intensive campaigns to support registration. For instance, during the time considered in
this study, FIS placed about three spots per day in countrywide broadcasted TV and radio channels.
We therefore do not consider unintentional evasion as a problem of any practical importance. One could
nevertheless consider a diﬀerent type of agents with Ur
j ≥ Uu
j > Ud
j , reﬂecting a preference for registering
– irrespective of the risk perception. For these agents, non-compliance can never yield a utility gain, even
if it remains undetected. As a consequence, changes in risk perceptions will not trigger any behavioral
response.
10One could equivalently study the formation of the agents’ perceptions of sanctions, reﬂected in Ud
j . As
our data cover information on detections but not on ﬁnes, we follow Sah (1991), focussing on the perceived
detection risk.
7(establishing a direct deterrent eﬀect of enforcement) as well as on information obtained
from others (giving rise to an indirect deterrent eﬀect). A formal analysis of the indirect
channel is provided by Sah (1991). In his model, agents update their beliefs on the detection
risk, making use of information obtained from sampling in their vicinity. An increase in the
number of detections within this sample would ceteris paribus result in an increased risk
perception. In turn, the propensity to commit a crime decreases.
Hence, learning about detections establishes a positive link between the actual and the
perceived detection risk. Given that such a link exists we expect a rise in the number
of detections within a municipality to trigger an increase in local self-reporting: the more
households are detected by licensing inspectors, the more likely an evader will be confronted
with a higher number of detections among his neighbors, friends and acquaintances. As a
consequence, the perceived risk of detection rises, and so does the evader’s inclination to
register. Due to this link between detections and individual perceptions, enforcement has
the potential to exert an indirect deterrent eﬀect on individuals who have not been subject
to enforcement. It is this spillover that we are going to study in the following.
3.2 Empirical Approach
The primary aim of our empirical analysis is to identify the causal eﬀect of enforcement on
self-reporting. More precisely, we want to assess to which extent licence fee evaders register
their broadcasting receivers in response to an increased number of detections within their
municipality.
We employ monthly data on enforcement and unsolicited registrations at the munici-
pality level. Our two key variables are the eﬀective enforcement rate (Enforcementit) and
the registration rate (Registrationit). The former measures monthly detections within a
municipality – the number of registrations credited with ﬁeld inspectors – per 1,000 house-
holds, whereas the registration rate is the corresponding rate of unsolicited registrations.
8The latter rate is taken to be determined by
Registrationit = α + βEnforcementit + γMobilityit + θi + ηt + it, (2)
where the subscripts i and t denote municipalities and months, respectively. Mobilityit
captures individuals moving into or within the municipality relative to the total number of
households,11 α is a constant, θi and ηt account for unobserved municipality and period-
speciﬁc eﬀects, respectively, and it is a residual. The parameter of interest, β, measures
the impact of enforcement on registrations.
Conceptually, our approach diﬀers from other work on law enforcement as we study the
link between enforcement and ‘quit decisions’ of those who violate the law (the decisions
of households who currently evade licence fees and stop doing so) rather than the link with
crime. By focusing on quit decisions, we avoid typical problems with the measurement of
crime as well as the possibility of crime displacement: if a local increase in enforcement has
a positive eﬀect on quit rates, this clearly captures deterrence and cannot be due to the
relocation of unlawful activity to other places.
As in many related contributions, the estimation of the model parameters is complicated
by the likely endogeneity of the enforcement rate. The problem is akin to the simultaneity
problem in studies addressing the impact of police on crime (Corman and Mocan, 2000;
Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Levitt, 1997, 2002). The endogeneity derives from the fact
that the level of enforcement is not randomly assigned to communities; it rather depends
on the level of compliance. If ﬁeld inspectors are more likely to be present in communities
with lower compliance levels (i.e. lower rates of unsolicited registration), we would expect
the covariance between Enforcementit and the residual it to be negative. As a consequence,
the OLS estimate of β would be biased downwards. Hence, similar as with estimations of
the deterrent impact of police on crime, we need to account for the simultaneity between
11The reason for including mobility is that moving will generate registrations whenever households de-
register at the old and re-register for licence fees at the new place. Recall, however, that FIS asks households
to just update their address in case of moving instead of de- and re-registering. If most households comply
to this procedure, the eﬀect of mobility on the registration rate should be modest.
9enforcement and compliance to obtain consistent parameter estimates.
To cope with the endogeneity of the enforcement rate, we make use of instrumental
variables (IVs). Our selection of IVs builds upon the incentives faced by the ﬁeld inspectors.
Recall that inspectors independently decide on their eﬀort level (hours worked per month,
the number of target households approached, etc.) as well as on which municipalities within
their domain to inspect in a given month. Remember further that licensing inspectors are
payed a constant piece rate for each registration they enforce, irrespective of the time
and eﬀort spent on driving to target households. Given these incentives, we presume the
inspectors’ overall eﬀort as well as their choice of target households to be sensitive to the
costs of going to diﬀerent areas.
In search of instrumental variables, we draw on descriptors of local weather and driving
conditions. These instruments appear promising for two reasons. Firstly, our data cover
the winter 2005/06, a long enduring winter with extraordinary heavy snowfalls. In the
south-eastern regions of Austria, for instance, the snowfall during November 2005 alone
amounted to more than 70% of the total snowfall in an average winter season. In December,
weather stations in the north and east registered record breaking snow levels – the average
amount of fresh snow measured at 241 stations located over all Austria was 73 centimeters
(with a median of 59 and a maximum of 235 centimeters). In January (February) 2006,
the average depth of snow was 50% (37%) above the long-term average. In March, the
corresponding number was 120%. These extraordinary weather conditions are also reﬂected
in the statistics on car accidents: the number of accidents which occurred on snow covered
streets was 90% above the level recorded for the mild winter of 2007.
Secondly, due to its location in the Eastern Alps, Austria is a very mountainous country
with substantial variation in altitude: while the lowermost parts of Austria are around 100
meters above sea level, only 32% of the municipalities are located below 500 meters. 25%
of all municipalities are located at altitudes higher than 675 meters, and 10% at altitudes
above 900 meters. In the lowermost parts of Austria, reasonable driving conditions are
typically restored rather quickly, even after heavy snowfalls. In the more mountainous
10areas, however, conditions often remain critical for many days, in particular during periods
of persistent snowfall. Driving to more remote, alpine municipalities then requires special
equipment like snow chains.
Based on these considerations, we selected three variables as instruments for the enforce-
ment rate: the amount of fresh snow (Snowfall), the interaction with the average altitude
of a municipality (Snowfall×Altitude), and – as an additional measure capturing variation
in driving conditions – the frequency of car accidents within the diﬀerent municipalities
(Accidents). While the main eﬀect of altitude is captured by the municipality ﬁxed ef-
fects, the interaction of snowfall with the local altitude allows a given level of snowfall to
have a diﬀerent, presumably stronger, impact in more mountainous areas. The ﬁrst-stage
regression then reads
Enforcementit = ϑ + λ1 Snowfallit + λ2 (Snowfall × Altitude)it + λ3 Accidentsit (3)
+ µMobilityit + ψi + χt + ωit,
where ψi and χt denote municipality and period eﬀects, respectively, and ωit is the ﬁrst-stage
residual.
3.3 Data
Our data set is based upon a record of all licence fee registrations by individual households
between November 2005 and March 2006. FIS provided us with comprehensive micro data
comprising a total of roughly 90,000 observations. For each individual registration, we
observe detailed information on the households’ place of residence (complete street address
and ZIP code) as well as the type of registration as listed in Table 1. For unsolicited
registrations, we know the date of the registration. For enforced registrations, we have
information on the month in which the household was detected.
In a ﬁrst step, we geocoded the micro data by matching geographic coordinates to each
individual registration. We then assigned each observation to one of the 2,380 Austrian
11municipalities (larger cities are split into zip code areas) and aggregated the micro data
to municipality-month cells, using the ﬁve month period starting with November 2005.
Eﬀectively, this procedure provided us with a municipality-by-month panel data set with
enforcement rates as well as registration rates for the diﬀerent registration types. All
these rates give the number of incidents relative to the number of households within a
municipality.
Our main results are based on a sample which essentially cuts the lower tail of the
municipality distribution in terms of population size. Firstly, we exclude municipalities
with less than 500 households. The main reason for doing so is that these municipalities
rarely see any enforcement. As a consequence, our key explanatory variable does not show
signiﬁcant variation in very small municipalities: almost 80% of the dropped municipalities
do not contain a single enforced registration over all ﬁve months. Secondly, we exclude
municipalities where we could not assign suﬃciently precise geographic coordinates to the
individual observations. This restriction assures a high accuracy in the assignment of reg-
istrations and incidents of enforcement to municipalities as well as in various measures
of physical distance between incidents which are introduced below. Thirdly, we eliminate
municipalities without any location (bank, postal oﬃce, etc.) oﬀering FIS’ hard-copy reg-
istration forms. This removes municipalities where the lack of hard-copy registration forms
could potentially induce correlation between the registration rate and our weather-related
instruments, which would question the validity of the exclusion restrictions (see discussion
below). Eﬀectively, the three restrictions leave us with 1,275 municipalities observed over
ﬁve months.12
Summary statistics on our key variables and several municipality characteristics are
listed in Table 2. On average, we observe 1.13 enforced registrations per 1,000 households.13
12Our parameter estimates are robust to relaxing these sample restrictions. In particular, the estimated
eﬀect of enforcement is virtually the same if we include all municipalities. However, using the full sample
weakens the IVs in the ﬁrst-stage regression. A similar ﬁnding is reported by Levitt (1997, p.283–4).
13The maximum of the enforcement rate comes from a municipality with 740 households where 13% of
them were detected evading. In the same month, the rate of unsolicited registrations jumped to 1.5% – 10
times the municipality’s mean registration rate in the four remaining months.
12Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Enforcement rate 1.13 5.10 0 130
Registration rate, unrestricted 2.60 2.43 0 46.4
Registration rate, restriction A 1.80 2.13 0 46.4
Registration rate, restriction A & B 1.75 2.05 0 46.4
Registration rate, restriction A & C50 1.70 2.01 0 46.4
Registration rate, restriction A & C75 1.68 2.00 0 46.4
Registration rate, restriction A & C100 1.67 1.99 0 46.4
Registration rate, restriction A & C125 1.65 1.98 0 46.4
Registration rate, restriction A & C150 1.64 1.97 0 46.4
Snowfall 0.42 0.34 0.01 2.60
Accident rate 0.34 0.64 0 9.46
Mobility rate 15.5 13.4 0 548
Altitude 456 222 117 1444
Number of households 2359 7278 500 115245
Population density 360 1622 5.15 25629
Municipality size 39.5 38.0 1.09 285
Number of observations: 6375 (N = 1275, T = 5). All rates deﬁned as total number of monthly incidents per 1000
households. Snowfall and Altitude are measured in meters, Municipality size in square kilometers, Population density in
inhabitants per square kilometer. Restrictions on the registration rate: Restriction A excludes unsolicited registrations
which were made online or by phone. Restriction B excludes unsolicited registrations which from households living in
multi-unit dwellings, where in the same month a registration was enforced by a ﬁeld inspector. Restriction C` excludes
unsolicited registrations from household living within ` meters to a place, where in the same month a registration was
enforced by a ﬁeld inspector.
Data sources: FIS (enforcement and registrations); Institute for Meteorology and Geodynamics, Vienna (snowfall); National
Council on Traﬃc Safety (accidents); Austrian Bureau of Statistics (mobility, altitude, number of households, municipality
size, population density).
With a mean registration rate of 2.6, unsolicited registrations are more frequent. For
a number of reﬁnements to be discussed below we will impose restrictions on this rate.
First, we compute a registration rate which excludes all online and phone-call registrations
(Restriction A). This restricted rate, which is only based on unsolicited registrations from
hard-copy forms, has a mean value of 1.8. Next, we impose additional restrictions based
on the geographical proximity of households with unsolicited registrations to evaders who
got detected by an inspector: Restriction B eliminates unsolicited registrations which come
from multi-unit dwellings (apartment houses, blocks, etc.), where in the same month a
registration was enforced by a ﬁeld inspector. Finally, we compute the minimum distance
of each unsolicited registration to the next enforced registration in the same month. Based
on this distance measure, we impose Restriction C`, which omits unsolicited registrations
from households living within ` meters to the next enforcement incidence. Drawing larger
13circles around cases of enforced registrations gradually reduces the restricted registration
rate from 1.70 (for ` = 50) to 1.64 (` = 150).
Turning to our instruments, we use data from two additional sources. From the Insti-
tute for Meteorology and Geodynamics in Vienna we obtained the monthly records of 241
weather stations located over all Austria. To each municipality we assigned the records
from the closest weather station (in terms of the great-circle distance between each sta-
tion and the centroid of the respective municipality). For the snowfall variable, we use
the accumulated amount of fresh snow for each month. Together with the municipalities’
altitude above sea level, this provides us with our ﬁrst two instruments, Snowfall and Snow-
fall×Altitude. The National Council on Traﬃc Safety provided us with data on monthly
accidents at the municipality level. We use the number of daytime accidents as a descrip-
tor of driving conditions.14 The corresponding accident rate (relative to 1,000 households)
forms our third instrument.
The measure for mobility is based on data provided by the Austrian Bureau of Statistics.
We computed the mobility rate as the number of individuals who moved into or within a
municipality relative to the number of households.15 Finally, note that our sample covers
municipalities from an altitude of 117 to more than 1400 meters, with an average number of
2359 households (median: 905), an average size of about 40 square kilometers and a mean
population density of 360 inhabitants per square kilometer (median: 96).
4 Results
This section describes our empirical ﬁndings. We show that enforcement has a sizable
impact on unsolicited registrations, and we demonstrate that the eﬀect is not driven by
personal observation or experience. Hence, our analysis suggests that the indirect deterrence
14Driving under the inﬂuence is the main cause for nighttime accidents. We focus on daytime accidents
to avoid variation in the instrument that is driven by this type of accidents.
15The mobility rate attains unusual high values in some small communities in Austria’s main tourist areas,
where seasonal workers are oﬃcially registered as new residents. Excluding these or any other outliers does
not change our results.
14Table 3: First-stage regression







Sample size (N × T) 6375
F-statistic for excluded IVs 9.60
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on municipalities) in
parentheses. F-statistic valid for i.i.d. errors. Additional regressors: Mobility rate
and a full series of period as well as municipality eﬀects. Snowfall is measured in
meters and altitude in 100 meters. Signiﬁcance level: ??? 1%.
eﬀect of enforcement is based on word of mouth. Finally, we provide evidence that the
spillover is limited to the close vicinity of detected households. This points to the role of
neighborhood communication in the dispersion of information on the actual enforcement
level.
First-Stage Regression
Before turning to the main results, let us brieﬂy discuss the performance of the IVs in the
ﬁrst-stage regression. Table 3 reports the ﬁxed-eﬀects regression of the enforcement rate on
the instruments, i.e. snowfall, snowfall interacted with altitude, and the accident rate, as
well as the mobility rate and a full series of period eﬀects. We ﬁnd that the snowfall-related
instruments are strongly partially correlated with the enforcement rate. Interestingly, the
coeﬃcient of snowfall is positive whereas the one for the interaction is negative. The ﬁrst-
stage coeﬃcients imply that snowfall raises the enforcement rate in municipalities with an
altitude below 530 meters, but lowers enforcement in municipalities located higher. The
accident rate as a direct measure of driving conditions shows the expected negative sign
and is almost signiﬁcant at the 10% level: for given weather conditions, inspectors are less
active in municipalities where the accident rate is high.
Taken together, the results of the ﬁrst-stage regression indicate that the behavior of the
licensing inspectors is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by local weather and driving conditions. More
15precisely, the coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst-stage regression suggest that the activity of inspectors
is driven by a sort of substitution eﬀect: they seem to avoid driving to more mountainous
areas in periods of heavy snowfall. Instead of reducing their overall eﬀort, however, they just
shift their focus and enforce more registrations in more easily accessible municipalities.16
Note also that the F-statistic of 9.6 indicates that our IVs have substantial predictive
power in the ﬁrst-stage regression, making us conﬁdent that we have identiﬁed instrumental
variables which are suﬃciently strongly correlated with the enforcement rate to solve our
identiﬁcation problem.17
With respect to the validity of the instruments, one might be concerned about a direct
impact of local weather conditions on households’ registration behavior. Note, however,
that we excluded municipalities without locations oﬀering FIS’ hard-copy forms from our
analysis, since an impact of weather conditions on registrations (if it is present) appears
most likely to occur in such municipalities. Note further that online and phone – in contrast
to hard-copy registrations – registrations should (if anything) be positively aﬀected by harsh
weather conditions. One might therefore conjecture that our IVs have a negative impact on
the share of hard-copy to all unsolicited registrations. To test this conjecture, we regressed
the share of hard-copy registrations on our instruments. The results (presented in the
Appendix) indicate that all our IVs are far from being statistically signiﬁcant predictors
of the ratio of hard-copy registrations. Further evidence on the validity of the exclusion
restrictions (also reported in the Appendix) is based on the fact that a substantial share of
all municipalities do not see any enforcement. In this sample, enforcement cannot have any
explanatory power, and we can run a reduced form regression that tests for a direct impact
of the IVs on registration behavior. Again, our IVs pass the test without any diﬃculty,
making us conﬁdent that we have identiﬁed a set of valid instruments.
16This ﬁnding seems to be in line with the notion of income targeting (compare the discussion in Camerer
et al., 1997, and Farber, 2008).
17Using a Stock-Yogo test on weak instruments (Stock and Yogo, 2005), we can reject the null of the
2SLS bias exceeding 10% of the OLS bias. We also replicated all our estimations using limited-information
maximum likelihood (LIML) and its modiﬁcation by Fuller (1977) (compare Andrews and Stock, 2005,
Hahn et al., 2004). All these alternative estimators provided point estimators as well as standard errors
which are almost identical to those reported below.
16Eﬀect of Enforcement
Table 4 reports our main estimation results on the eﬀect of enforcement. Column (I)
displays the ﬁxed eﬀects OLS estimation of Equation (2), ignoring the likely endogeneity
of enforcement. The coeﬃcient of the enforcement rate is estimated to be 0.134, and it is
highly signiﬁcant. Moreover, we ﬁnd a positive impact of mobility on registrations, but the
eﬀect is far from being economically signiﬁcant.18
As outlined above, we expect the OLS estimate of β to be biased downwards. This
expectation is conﬁrmed if we turn to the ﬁxed eﬀects IV estimations. Columns (II) to
(IV) report results derived from estimating Equation (2) by two-stage least squares (2SLS)
while instrumenting enforcement by snowfall, snowfall×altitude and the accident rate. In
Column (II), we retain the unrestricted registration rate as the dependent variable. The
eﬀect of enforcement is now estimated to be 0.361, suggesting that the bias in the OLS
estimate is substantial. The eﬀect for household mobility is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.19
The coeﬃcient of the enforcement rate indicates a remarkably strong eﬀect. According
to the estimates in Column (II), one additional detection leads to about 0.36 additional
unsolicited registrations. Hence, on average three additional detections trigger more than
one additional registration. Taking into account that the scope for any deterrence eﬀect of
detections is limited by the high compliance rate – nationwide only 6% of all households
are evading licence fees – the estimated eﬀect is sizable. To illustrate this point, consider
a municipality with 1000 households and an initial enforcement rate of zero. On average,
there will be 60 households who have not registered for licence fees. If now a ﬁeld inspector
enforces 20 registrations, we predict another seven unsolicited registrations (assuming a
linear eﬀect). In this case, the indirect eﬀect of enforcement would deter 17.5% of the
18This is in line with our conjecture that most moving households just update the address in their FIS
account instead of de-registering at the old and re-registering at the new place of residence.
19Throughout the paper, we focus on the contemporary eﬀect of enforcement. OLS estimations incor-
porating lagged values of enforcement indicate that this approach is justiﬁed: magnitude and signiﬁcance
of the impact of present enforcement are hardly eﬀected, whereas the lagged enforcement rate is neither
economically nor statistically signiﬁcant.
17Table 4: Eﬀect of enforcement
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Estimator FE OLS FE IV FE IV FE IV
Dependent variable
Registration rate unrestricted unrestricted restriction A restriction A&B
Enforcement rate 0.134??? 0.361??? 0.321??? 0.273???
(0.015) (0.114) (0.104) (0.094)
Mobility rate 0.007??? 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sample size (N × T) 6375 6375 6375 6375
Hansen test (p-value) – 0.287 0.200 0.222
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on municipalities) in parentheses. All estimations include a full
series of period eﬀects. Signiﬁcance levels: ??? 1%.
Restrictions on the registration rate: Restriction A excludes unsolicited registrations which were made online or by phone.
Restriction B excludes unsolicited registrations which were made by a household living in multi-unit dwellings, where in
the same month at least one registration was enforced by a ﬁeld inspector.
remaining evaders.
Regarding the ﬁgures from table 1, our estimates suggest that the roughly 30,000 en-
forced registrations triggered about 10,000 unsolicited registrations (assuming again a linear
relationship). Thus, 20% of all unsolicited registrations emerge as a direct response to local
ﬁeld inspections.
Own Experience or Word of Mouth
We argue that the impact of enforcement is driven by the local dispersion of information,
establishing a positive link between the actual and the perceived detection risk: evaders
learn about more frequent detections in their municipality, update their risk perception and
are ceteris paribus more inclined to register. In this vain, enforcement triggers a deterrence
spillover driven by word of mouth.
The updating of risk perceptions may be based on own experiences and observations as
well as on information obtained from neighbors, friends or acquaintances. Regarding the
design of optimal enforcement policies, however, it is important to discriminate between
both channels. In particular, it is crucial to identify the power of information spread
by word of mouth. If communication among acquaintances is suﬃcient to establish a
18positive detection–perception link, even non-public enforcement activities (e.g. the auditing
of potential tax evaders) would result in a deterrence spillover. Otherwise, deterrence relies
on the public visibility of enforcement measures.20
Despite the fact that the presence of inspectors is not observable to the public, one
can think of several ways in which personal experience could drive the deterrent eﬀect of
enforcement. For instance, consider people who were absent while a ﬁeld inspector was at
their door. Recall that in these cases inspectors leave an information brochure together
with a registration form at the door. Registrations which are made using these forms
are identiﬁed in our data as enforced registrations. Thus, they do not spoil the count
of unsolicited registrations. However, households could (i) ignore the registration form
which was left at their door, go to one of the municipal or post oﬃces to pick up another
registration form (which looks exactly like the form distributed with inspectors’ information
brochures) and register with this form. Alternatively, they could (ii) register via phone or
internet. We consider the ﬁrst case as extremely unlikely to happen. In contrast, the second
case, i.e. phone or online registration after being approached by an inspector, seems to be
quite realistic. Fortunately, our data allow us to identify this type of registrations. Hence,
we can compute the rate of unsolicited registrations excluding those which were made by
phone or online (Restriction A) and check the robustness of our ﬁndings.
Another scenario where own experience could contribute to the deterrent eﬀect of en-
forcement is the immediate observation of door-to-door inspections by neighbors. If by-
standers who evade fees respond to their observation with a registration, this would still
reﬂect a deterrence spillover from enforcement, but it would be driven by personal expe-
rience.21 Again our data allow us to run a robustness check testing to which extent such
cases might potentially drive our ﬁnding. We can do so by excluding all unsolicited reg-
20We consider it as obvious that public visibility strengthens deterrence (not taking into account eﬀects
from stigmatization). In a wide range of applications, however, establishing a clear public observability of
sanctions can be quite costly to implement (think of tax enforcement, for instance) and even undesirable
from a normative viewpoint (e.g. to avoid undesirable stigmatization in case of false charges, ‘lynch law’,
etc.).
21Note that such cases can only emerge if the fact that the bystander evades licence fees is unknown to
the ﬁeld inspector. Otherwise the inspector would directly approach the bystander to enforce a registration.
19istrations from households living in apartment buildings or multi-family houses where the
data indicate the presence of a licensing inspector in the same month (Restriction B).
Results based on the restricted registration rates are reported in Columns (III) and
(IV) of Table 4. As with the unrestricted registration rate, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of
enforcement. Despite the fact that restriction A excludes roughly 40% of all unsolicited
registrations and reduces the registration rate from 2.6 to 1.8 (see Table 2), the estimated
coeﬃcients for enforcement in Column (III) is only slightly below the one from (II). As
shown in Column (IV), the coeﬃcient further decreases if we impose restrictions A and B
at the same time. This could mean that some registrations in the neighborhood are indeed
driven by personal experience. However, the smaller point estimates could also arise from
our restrictions excluding truly unsolicited registrations which are induced by communica-
tion among immediate neighbors. In either case: enforcement still has a sizable spillover on
registrations, even if we exclude those cases which could be driven by personal experience.
Hence, our data suggest that the deterrence spillover is due to word of mouth, mediating
the dispersion of information on enforcement and thereby stimulating registrations.
Spatial Limits of the Spillover
The ﬁndings reported so far demonstrate a signiﬁcant indirect deterrence eﬀect of enforce-
ment. We now want to trace the spatial limits of this eﬀect, i.e. we want to study how
far-reaching the behavioral impact of word of mouth is. This is important for assessing
whether widely (spatially) spread enforcement activities trigger a larger deterrence spillover
than locally focused measures.
Our approach takes advantage of the detailed micro structure of the data base. Exploit-
ing the fact that we observe the exact location of all households with enforced or unsolicited
registrations, we computed the distance of each household with an unsolicited registration
to the most nearby household who was detected by a ﬁeld inspector in the same month.
Across all individual observations, we ﬁnd a median distance of 269 meters (mean: 593 me-
ters). 75% [25%] of all unsolicited registrations emerge more than 74 meters [680 meters]
20Table 5: Fixed eﬀects IV estimations under spatial restrictions
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Dependent variable
Registration rate A&C50 A&C75 A&C100 A&C125 A&C150
under restriction:
Minimum distance to
enforcement incident: 50m 75m 100m 125m 150m
Enforcement rate 0.207?? 0.186?? 0.154? 0.153? 0.130
(0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092)
Mobility rate 0.0047 0.0054? 0.0050? 0.0044 0.0025
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Sample size (N × T) 6375 6375 6375 6375 6375
Hansen test (p-value) 0.307 0.364 0.342 0.414 0.405
Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on municipalities) in parentheses. All estimations include
a full series of period eﬀects. Signiﬁcance levels: ??? 1%, ?? 5%, ? 10%.
Restrictions on the registration rate: Restriction A excludes unsolicited registrations which were made online or by
phone. Restriction C`’ excludes unsolicited registrations from households who live within ` ∈ {50,75,...,150} meters
to a place with an enforced registration in the same month.
away from the next incidence of enforcement.
Based on the distance measure, one can impose another set of restrictions on our de-
pendent variable. For each municipality, we compute the rate of unsolicited registrations
excluding those emerging within 50, 75, 100 meters, etc. to the next enforced registration.
Maintaining our focus on indirect deterrence, we also adhere to restriction A, which ex-
cludes all phone and online registrations. Tightening the spatial restriction, i.e. drawing
larger circles around detected households, excludes more unsolicited registrations and yields
lower registration rates. As Table 2 reveals, the resulting decline in the rate is quite small.
The results displayed in Table 5 show that the spatial restrictions nevertheless have a strong
impact on our estimates.
Column (I) reports the ﬁxed eﬀects IV estimation of Equation (2), where the dependent
variable is restricted to unsolicited registrations with a minimum distance of at least 50
meter to the next enforced registration. We still ﬁnd a sizable eﬀect of enforcement, statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. On average, ﬁve detections would trigger one additional
unsolicited (‘hard-copy’) registration beyond the 50 meter circle around enforcement inci-
dences. As compared to the point estimate from Column (III) in Table 4, the coeﬃcient
21is reduced by one third. If we increase the spatial constraint to 75 meters, the eﬀect of
enforcement declines further but remains signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In Column (III), with
a distance threshold of at least 100 meters, the signiﬁcance level drops to 10%. Finally,
Column (V) shows that for a minimum distance of 150 meters, enforcement is no longer
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Further tightening the restriction beyond
150 meters does not change the pattern indicated in Table 5: the point estimates for the
coeﬃcient continue to decline steadily, while the standard errors remain roughly constant.
The ﬁndings reported in Table 5 suggest that the indirect deterrence eﬀect of enforce-
ment is limited to the close vicinity of households who have been subject to enforcement.
This supports the interpretation that the spillover eﬀect is mainly driven by word of mouth
on enforcement within neighborhoods. However, caution is warranted when interpreting
this result, as our data do not allow to identify the role of alternative layers of social inter-
action. Communication at the workplace, for instance, could contribute to a spillover which
may work beyond neighborhoods and even municipalities. Notwithstanding, the results in
Table 5 suggest that in our setting, communication within neighborhoods is an important
channel that mediates information on detections and thereby shapes the deterrent eﬀect of
enforcement.22
5 Concluding Discussion
This paper studies the role of word of mouth for deterrence. Using data on TV licence
fee registrations, we ask whether households who have not been subject to enforcement by
licensing inspectors react to changes in the local level of enforcement. Since the actual level
of enforcement is likely to be endogenous to registration behavior, our estimations rely on
22The fact that the deterrence spillover is concentrated in the close neighborhood of detection incidences
could – in principle – also stem from the segregation of households into evader and non-evader neighbor-
hoods. Our data render this explanation implausible, since detected households are broadly spread within
municipalities. Across all municipalities, the median distance between detected households within a mu-
nicipality is more than 1300 meters. Compared to the median minimum distance of unsolicited to enforced
registrations of 269 meters, this is quite a large distance. In addition, the mere fact that a spatial exclusion
with a radius of ` = 200 meters reduces the respective registration rate by only 10% (compare Table 2)
contradicts this interpretation.
22instrumental variables capturing variation in local weather and driving conditions.
We derive three main results. Firstly, we ﬁnd a strong deterrent eﬀect of enforcement.
If enforcement is increased such that three unregistered households are forced to register,
this will, on average, induce the registration of one additional household which has not been
subject to enforcement. Hence, we show that an increase in enforcement has a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on compliance behavior. Our study therefore corroborates the existing evidence on
the deterrent impact of police. This is an important result in its own right since, due to the
speciﬁc features of our setting, we can exclude the presence of crime displacement eﬀects
or erroneous measurement of crime rates.
Secondly, we demonstrate that the deterrent eﬀect works through word of mouth. Dis-
tinguishing between households which have been subject to enforcement and those which
have not, we are able to show a change in registration behavior of households for which
word of mouth on the actual level of enforcement is the only plausible source of new in-
formation. Our ﬁndings suggest that the key mechanism analyzed by Sah (1991), i.e. the
updating of risk perceptions by sampling among acquaintances, can give rise to a strong
indirect deterrent eﬀect of enforcement.
Finally we provide evidence pointing to an important role of neighborhood communica-
tion for the dispersion of information on enforcement. This relates our ﬁndings to studies
demonstrating the importance of neighborhood communication for decision making in many
diﬀerent contexts as, for instance, investment decisions (Hong et al., 2005 ) and job search
(Ioannides and Loury, 2004).
Having identiﬁed the deterrent power of word of mouth, it is self-evident that personal
experiences contributes to deterrence, too. This is also conﬁrmed by Lochner (2007), who
documents the link between personal experience and individuals’ beliefs about arrest proba-
bilities. While in his study beliefs are also correlated with county-level arrest rates, this link
is weak – eventually due to the high level of aggregation. In this vein, our municipality-level
evidence complements Lochner’s ﬁndings.
Our study carries a number of implications for the design of optimal enforcement poli-
23cies. When communication among individuals is suﬃcient to establish a positive link be-
tween actual enforcement and the perceived risk of detection, even ‘hidden’ enforcement
activities can have signiﬁcant deterrence spillovers. Furthermore, the sizable indirect de-
terrent eﬀect found in our data illustrates that it is crucial to consider indirect deterrence
eﬀects when assessing the marginal social beneﬁts from enforcement activities. For law
enforcement in a domain where public visibility is costly to implement, it might be eﬃcient
to stick to hidden enforcement measures. This applies particularly to cases where there
are either normative (e.g. avoiding undesirable stigmatization in case of false charges) or
strategic reasons to prevent publicity.
Several points are left for future research. In particular, we would like to know more
about the long-run role of word of mouth on enforcement in altering risk perceptions and
behavior. While our results focus on the short-run linkage, a better understanding of the
long-term formation of perceptions might be useful to improve the eﬀectiveness of enforce-
ment. Due to the short time spell covered by our data, a proper analysis of this issue
is beyond the scope of the present study. The same holds true for the potential hetero-
geneity of deterrence through word of mouth. It would be interesting to explore how the
transmission of information on enforcement depends on municipality or neighborhood char-
acteristics. The identiﬁcation of this heterogeneity, however, is complicated by additional
layers of cross-sectional variation (in terms of risk aversion, the level of non-compliance,
etc.), which all interact in shaping the actual deterrent eﬀect of enforcement. Further em-
pirical research on the link between enforcement and the formation of individual perceptions
is needed to clarify this and several other related questions.
References
Andrews, D. W., and J. H. Stock (2005): “Inference with Weak Instruments,” NBER
Technical Working Paper 0313.
Becker, G. S. (1968): “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of
24Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217.
Camerer, C., L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, and R. Thaler (1997): “Labor Supply
of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112(2), 407–441.
Corman, H., and H. N. Mocan (2000): “A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence,
and Drug Abuse in New York City,” American Economic Review, 90(3), 584–604.
Di Tella, R., and E. Schargrodsky (2004): “Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates
Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack,” American Economic
Review, 94(1), 115133.
Drago, F., R. Galbiati, and P. Vertova (2007): “The Deterrent Eﬀects of Prison:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” IZA Discussion Papers No. 2912.
Farber, H. S. (2008): “Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case
of New York City Taxi Drivers,” American Economic Review, 98(3), 1069–82.
Fellner, G., R. Sausgruber, and C. Traxler (2009): “Legal Threat, Moral Ap-
peal and Social Information: Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field,” Mimeo, Max
Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn.
Fuller, W. A. (1977): “Some Properties of a Modiﬁcation of the Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood Estimator,” Econometrica, 45(4), 939–954.
Hahn, J., J. Hausmann, and G. Kuersteiner (2004): “Estimation with Weak Instru-
ments: Accuracy of Higher Order Bias and MSE Approximation,” Econometrics Journal,
7(1), 272–306.
Hong, H., J. D. Kubik, and J. C. Stein (2005): “Thy Neighbor’s Portfolio: Word-
of-Mouth Eﬀects in the Holdings and Trade of Money Managers,” Journal of Finance,
60(6), 2801–24.
25Horney, J., and I. H. Marshall (1992): “Risk Perceptions among Serious Oﬀenders:
The Role of Crime and Punishment,” Criminology, 30(4), 575–594.
Ioannides, Y. M., and L. D. Loury (2004): “Job Information Networks, Neighborhood
Eﬀects, and Inequality,” Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4), 1056–1093.
Jacob, B., L. Lefgren, and E. Moretti (2007): “The Dynamics of Criminal Behavior:
Evidence from Weather Shocks,” Journal of Human Resources, 42(3), 489–527.
Kaplow, L., and S. Shavell (1994): “Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting
of Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), 583–606.
Kessler, D., and S. D. Levitt (1999): “Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish
between Deterrence and Incapacitation,” Journal of Law and Economics, 42(1), 343–63.
Levitt, S. D. (1997): “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Eﬀect of
Police on Crime,” American Economic Review, 87(3), 270–90.
(1998): “Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence,
Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?,” Economic Inquiry, 36(3), 353–72.
(2002): “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Eﬀects of Police
on Crime: Reply,” American Economic Review, 92(4), 1244–1250.
Lochner, L. (2007): “Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System,” American
Economic Review, 97(1), 444–460.
MacDonald, Z. (2002): “Oﬃcial Crime Statistics: Their Use and Interpretation,” Eco-
nomic Journal, 112, F85–F106.
Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti (2004): “Economic Shocks and Civil
Conﬂict: An Instrumental Variables Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 112(4),
725–753.
26Montmarquette, C., M. Nerlove, and P. Forest (1985): “Deterrence and Delin-
quency: An Analysis of Individual Data,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 1, 37–58.
Nagin, D. S. (1998): “Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century,” Crime and Justice, 23, 1–42.
Newcomb, H. (ed.) (2004): The Museum of Broadcast Communications Encyclopedia of
Television. Routledge, New York, 2nd edn.
Parker, J., and H. G. Grasmick (1979): “Linking Actual and Perceived Certainty of
Punishment: An Exploratory Study of an Untested Proposition in Deterrence Theory,”
Criminology, 17(3), 366–379.
Paternoster, R., L. E. Saltzman, G. P. Waldo, and T. G. Chiricos (1985):
“Assessments of Risk and Behavioral Experience: An Exploratory Study of Change,”
Criminology, 23(3), 417–436.
Piliavin, I., R. Gartner, C. Thornton, and R. L. Matsueda (1986): “Crime,
Deterrence, and Rational Choice,” American Sociological Review, 51(1), 101–119.
Richards, P., and C. R. Tittle (1982): “Socioeconomic Status and Perceptions of
Personal Arrest Probabilities,” Criminology, 20(3-4), 329–346.
Sah, R. K. (1991): “Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime,” Journal of Political Economy,
99(6), 1272–95.
Statistics Austria (2006): “Ergebnisse der Europaeischen Erhebung ueber den Einsatz
von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien in Unternehmen und Haushalten
2006,” Statistics Austria, Vienna.
Stock, J. H., and M. Yogo (2005): “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Re-
gression,” in Identiﬁcation and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of
Thomas Rothenberg, ed. by D. W. Andrews, and J. H. Stock, pp. 80–108. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
27Traxler, C., and J. Winter (2009): “Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforce-
ment,” Working Paper 2009-03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods,
Bonn.
28Appendix: Validity of Instruments
A potential concern regarding our IV strategy is that unsolicited registrations, in particular
those made by hard-copy forms, could be directly inﬂuenced by the local weather conditions.
This would be the case if the willingness to go to one of the locations that provide the
necessary registration form is aﬀected by snowfall. The forms are available at almost 6,400
municipal and post oﬃces as well as at branches of banks. On average, there are 4.5 such
locations per 1,000 households. Moreover, these locations are typically located at central
places within a community and in shopping areas. In general, it is hard to think of people
who are – for an entire month – detained from passing these areas due to weather conditions.
Let us nevertheless address the concern in more detail. Note ﬁrst that we have excluded
municipalities which do not have any location oﬀering FIS forms from our sample of munic-
ipalities, because in such municipalities a dependence of hard-copy registrations on snowfall
is most likely. A straightforward approach to test the validity of our IVs is to check for a
potential impact of our descriptors of local weather conditions on registration behavior by
means of regressions. Obviously, harsh weather conditions could decrease the willingness
of households to register via hard-copy forms, as this implies some sort of outdoor mobil-
ity, suggesting that the share of hard-copy registrations among all unsolicited registrations
should go down (and, vice versa, the share of online and phone registrations should go up)
in months with heavy snowfalls.23
We test this hypothesis by regressing the share of hard-copy registrations on our in-
struments. The results (see Table 6) indicate that snowfall is far from being a statistically
signiﬁcant predictor of the share of hard-copy registrations, lending further support to the
view that our identiﬁcation relies on a set of valid instruments.
A second test exploits the fact that a substantial share of all municipalities do not see
any enforcement over all ﬁve months considered. If we restrict our attention to the sample
23Telecommunication networks in Austria are designed to remain unaﬀected even by severe winter con-
ditions. Hence, there is no reason to think that online and phone registrations will be negatively aﬀected
by snowfall.
29Table 6: Fixed Eﬀects Estimation – Share of hard-copy form registrations
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Snowfall -0.024 -0.001 -0.024 - -0.001
(0.025) (0.062) (0.025) (0.062)
Snowfall×Altitude - -0.004 - - -0.004
(0.010) (0.010)
Accidents - - -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Sample size 5412 5412 5412 5412 5412
Dependent variable is the share of hard-copy form registrations on all registrations. Municipality-month cells with
a registration rate of zero have been dropped. Standard errors (robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on
municipalities) in parentheses. All estimations include a full series of period eﬀects.
of these municipalities, enforcement cannot have any explanatory power. With no need to
account for enforcement and, thus, to impose an exclusion restriction with respect to the
IVs, we can estimate a reduced form,
Registrationit = α + ρ1 Snowfallit + ρ2 (Snowfall × Altitude)it + ρ3 Accidentsit (4)
+ γMobilityit + θi + ηt + it.
In this regression, we just have to evaluate the t-statistics of ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 to test for a
direct impact of our IVs on registration behavior. Table 7 reports two diﬀerent reduced form
regressions. Column (I) uses the unrestricted registration rate as the dependent variable and
derives the direct eﬀect of the IVs on registrations. The estimation is based on a balanced
panel of municipalities with zero enforcement over the whole period considered (note that
this is a subsample of those communities which were used to derive our main results). It
turns out that for all IVs, i.e. Snowfall, Snowfall×Altitude, and Accidents, the null of no
impact on the registration rate cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of signiﬁcance.
Since a potential eﬀect of weather and driving conditions on registrations is most likely for
hard copy registrations, we report in Column (II) the reduced form regression using the
registration rate under Restriction A (phone and online registrations excluded). The results
closely match those obtained in the ﬁrst Column. Moreover, the IVs remain insigniﬁcant
also if we regress the registration rate one each instrument separately (results not reported).
30Table 7: Reduced-form estimation for municipalities with zero enforcement
(I) (II)
Dependent variable:







Mobility rate 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Sample size 2690 2690
Fixed eﬀects estimation including a full series of period eﬀects. Sample consists of balanced
panel of municipalities with zero enforcement over all ﬁve months. Standard errors (robust
to heteroscedasticity and clustering on municipalities) in parentheses.
Hence, estimations of the reduced form for the subsample of municipalities with zero overall
enforcement provide strong support for the validity of the exclusion restriction on our IVs.
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